Israeli military investigation into a series of errors in the Hamas-led attack on October 7, 2023 acknowledges the “complete failure” of the Army to prevent it.
By saying it was a highly coordinated attack that investigators had planned for years, a group of Hamas-led fighters broke out from Gaza, attacking Israeli communities along the frontier and music festivals.
In total, 1,139 people were killed during the attack and about 250 were taken prisoner.
The report details the history of misconceptions about the risks raised by Hamas, and its refusal to accept warning signs of attacks, and the Army cannot coordinate its response.
The report bared many of the Israeli military’s failures on October 7, 2023, but similar investigations into political failures have been repeatedly blocked by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his right-wing coalition.
How did Israeli military underestimate Hamas?
The Army has decades of “fundamental misconceptions” in Hamas, leading senior officers to underestimate the group’s capabilities and intentions, according to the report.
Investigators said military planners assumed Hamas was not posed a major threat to Israel and was not interested in a massive war.
Planners also believed that Hamas’ tunnel network had deteriorated significantly, and that Israel’s high-tech separation barriers had easily blocked cross-border threats.
Israeli authorities have argued that despite warning signs like the extraordinary activity of Hamas fighters, the group focused on maintaining governance within Gaza, attacking Israel with rockets rather than large-scale ground invasions.
They also misunderstood Hamas leader Yahya Singwar, assuming he was “not interested in the wider war.”
What warning intelligence did Israel ignore before the attack?
In the time leading up to the attack, Israeli forces ignored or misinterpreted some indications that the attack was imminent, the report said.
In the evening before the attack, several female spotters warned the commander of unusual activity along the border. Additionally, officers reported massive activation of Israeli SIM cards known to be in the hands of Hamas fighter jets, and suspicious movements in Hamas’ rocket deployment.
But instead, the commander relied on what they said was a “reassuring sign” that Hamas was simply conducting military exercises.
How did the Israeli Intelligence news misunderstand the event?
Hamas has begun considering an invasion in October 2016, according to the report.
However, the Israeli intelligence news community has rejected reports such as “unrealistic,” believing Hamas was blocked by Israeli response to the Israeli uprising in May 2021, when Israel killed 232 people in Gaza.
The Israeli forces have since noticed that Hamas has decided to launch the attack in April 2022. By September of that year, 85% had been ready, and in May 2023 we had set a date to October 7th.
What was Israel’s operational failure that day?
Many.
The army was not ready for the attack, investigators discovered, and the deployment of the army was significantly delayed, allowing Palestinian fighters to immediately push without resisting.
In one Kibutz, Nir Oz, accused of abandoning the army, a survivor later told the Israeli Chief of Staff that the last Palestinian fighter jet left long before the first Israeli soldiers entered.
The number of fighter jets also has a wide range of marks, and it turns out that planners have a significant underestimation of the scale of their attacks.
It was later determined that 5,600 fighters crossed the border in three waves, backed by a barrage of around 4,000 rockets and 57 drones.
As a result, Israel’s Gaza division of over 700 soldiers was overwhelmed and remained “defeated” for hours, and military planners didn’t realize it.
Until around 12pm [10:00 GMT]when reinforcements began to arrive, its Gaza division began to operate.
The report also noted that the Israeli Air Force struggled to distinguish Hamas fighters from Israeli civilians. The report avoids falling into detail, but the military has accepted that the Israelites were killed in a friendly fire.
At the same time as the attack, investigators discovered that many aircraft were deployed against the homes of senior commanders of Gaza, Commander Hamas, instead of defending civilians and soldiers under attack.
Has the commander ordered Hannibal’s order?
According to several Israeli newspapers, yes, and as a result, many civilians have died.
Hannibal’s order that ordered Israeli forces to prevent killing anyone around them to adopt all the power they can to prevent Israeli combatants from being taken prisoner was ordered during the attack, Israel was ordered daily.
Therefore, on October 7th of the Israeli army, an order was issued to prevent Hamas from returning to Gaza with prisoners “at all costs.”
Several pilots flying across the battlefield reportedly reluctant to act on orders, and sometimes stopped firing entirely out of concern over attacking civilians.
Nevertheless, subsequent investigations show that several civilians were killed as a result of the Hannibal Directive.
Eflat Katz was killed in a helicopter fire as he was transported to Gaza by the Hamas Fighters.
At Kibbutz Be’eri, an Israeli tank fired two shells into a house known to carry dozens of prisoners, including 12-year-old twins. Only two prisoners survived.
What are the important points?
Prior to the attack, important warnings such as increased fighter activity and intelligence reports were ignored or misinterpreted.
The Israeli military’s assessment underestimated the scale of the attack.
Israeli forces responded to Hamas-led attacks and aid arrived too late.
No similar investigations have been conducted into government actions before and after the attack.
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