Whether in the form of today’s Russian Empire, the Soviet Union or the Russian Federation, Kremlin residents have been driven by the desire to be recognized as “great power.”
These ambitions are explored by Russian and British historian Sergei Radchenko to run the world for his book: Cold War bids on the global power of the Kremlin.
Radchenko spoke to Al Jazeera about the need for legitimacy on the Moscow world stage and the role he played in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Al Jazeera: Given the hostility between Moscow and the West, can we live in another Cold War?
Sergei Radchenko: There were two forces in the Cold War that were opposed to each other. One was the Soviet Union and one was the US. In today’s environment, there is something similar to that competition, but between the US and China, not Russia, but fellow competitors.
Russia is not really in the same league as China and the US, as Putin would like to argue that it is.
And during the Cold War there was a clear juxtaposition between these two rival camps: the world of capitalism and the world of socialism. Today, in some way, the United States, certainly under the president [Donald] Trump and Russia are more consistent than contradictions of values. I don’t hear about democracy and dictatorship anymore.
However, there is also continuity, and it appears that the important continuity is the existence of nuclear weapons. They inevitably remain as a major part of the photograph.
Al Jazeera: To what extent does the desire for recognition promote Kremlin politics?
Radchenko: I think this is the biggest continuity between the Cold War and the post-Cold War war. I argue that today’s foreign policy of the Soviet Union, China and Russia is driven by the desire to be recognized as a legitimate power above all else. Through the Soviet Cold War, they could see that they wanted to recognize their status as a comparable superpower with similar rights to the US rights. It was justification that they derived from such perceptions, and sometimes they were happy to compromise.
This was also true [Soviet leader Josef] Stalin. People say all sorts of things about Stalin. Much of it is true, about him being a terrible dictator, a deep cynical and manipulative person… [But] It’s a lesser profit for Stalin, but in America’s perception it was better than a greater profit without America’s perception. He withheld support from the Communists in the Greek civil war until 1947 due to an agreement with the British that Greece was in the realm of British influence.
So I think the principle of external perception, particularly the principle of US Soviet interests, continued and spread to Russia’s foreign policy. Looking at Putin’s foreign policy today, what does he want more than anything? He wants to recognize Russian interests in Ukraine as legal. He’s obsessed with this idea. He feels he can determine the fate of Ukraine on the heads of Ukrainians and Europeans. He cares that America will give him a position of equal power.
Al Jazeera: What does this amazing power world view look like?
RADCHENKO: It is Russia’s 19th century vision, and as a great force at the heart of its own influence, it can project its power onto its neighbors. Soviet leaders also considered the countries that were immediately adjacent to the Soviet Union to be within the realm of their influence. Stalin was an imperialist in the 19th century.
Why did they make them think they have such a right? In 1963, Soviet Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev met [Cuban leader] Fidel Castro Sino in the context of Soviet division. Castro asked him, “Why are you arguing with the Chinese?”
“They want to play their first fiddle,” replied Krushev.
In a friend’s company, someone is recognized as a leader, and this happens naturally thanks to superior qualities. That’s how I felt that the Soviet Union was a great power and the leader of the socialist camp, as it was better and deserved by anyone else. Asking why makes little sense.
Putin continues this tradition in many ways. When they feel that others will deny it to them, they are responsible for asserting this claim through violence. And this is what we have in Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. Countries categorized in their territory of influence must be postponed to the Kremlin wishes. And if someone doesn’t provide a reason to punish them to show others their place, like Ukraine.
Looking more globally, if Russia is clearly entitled to the realm of its influence, you would think that other great powers are allowed to do theirs too. And it’s here that Putin has thoughts alongside Trump. Trump’s rhetoric about the Panama Canal in Canada can be seen immediately that it is the way he spoke about Greenland. All of that means he thinks the Western Hemisphere is essentially an American playground.
During the Cold War, challenges to America’s global interests were considered potentially significant. Whether they happened in Vietnam, Afghanistan [or] Africa was important to the United States as it was engaged in this global struggle for its influence with the Soviet Union. Even in West Berlin, far from America surrounded by Soviet-controlled East Germany, Americans went to the brink of nuclear war and defended their right to stay there.
Today, Trump’s vision appears to be something else. American interests are no longer global.
Al Jazeera: How do you distinguish between great powers and “less” countries?
Radchenko: America was primarily a great force that it wanted to be recognized naturally. But gradually and reluctantly, they also began to recognize China as having the near-natural right to become a great force.
But at the same time, they formed a very negative view of many European countries. It feels like they’re already past their age. They concluded that Europe was a force used during and after World War II. For a while they thought maybe Britain could somehow become a great force in Europe, but that impression faded after it became clear that Britain was not an island there, for example, an empire that could claim the greatness of the Empire during the Suez crisis.
Even today, I am a bit attached to the “Anglo-Saxons” in Russia, but like there is some kind of illicit plot to restore Britain to a position of great power.
Al Jazeera: Russia has many social issues. Why not spend this energy on improving the lives of Russians?
Radchenko: A country that has historically been conditioned to consider itself as a great power is superior to its weak neighbors, and thus defines greatness through its lens. In other words, they only feel better when they can control others. It emphasizes the greatness of Russia in many Russians’ eyes. And I think they’ll prioritize that almost all.
One thing that happened in the Soviet Union was that the bargain was not held in the end. The Soviets claimed that they were great power, but they could never save for their people.
Today, Russia is trying to balance. On the one hand, they project the greatness of this empire and sell it to their own people. On the other hand, there is still toilet paper. And yes, if Russia focused on its own internal issues and did not engage in a war against its neighbors, the quality of life would not be that high. But that’s not a dire situation like the Soviet Union. This makes it more elastic than the Soviet model.
Editor’s Note: This interview was lightly edited for clarity and brevity.
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