The backdoor talk in encrypted services has been coming back to the round after reports revealed that the UK government is trying to force Apple to provide Icloud end-to-end encryption (E2EE) device backups Masu. Officials were said to be leaning against Apple to create a “backdoor” on a service that would allow state officials to access clear data.
Since passing the 2016 update to state surveillance authority, the UK has had the drastic powers to restrict the use of strong encryption by technology companies. According to a report by the Washington Post, UK officials seek Apple’s demand for “blanket” access to data that Icloud Advanced Data Protection (ADP) services are designed to protect from third parties. We use the Investigation Authority Act (IPA) to do so. Party access including Apple itself.
Apple’s technical architecture of ADP services is designed so that even the tech giants don’t hold encryption keys – thanks to the use of end-to-end encryption (E2EE) – Apple has “zero knowledge” I’ll make sure I promise that I’m there. of user data.
Backdoor is a term that is normally deployed to describe secret vulnerabilities inserted into code to enable third parties, bypass security measures or otherwise undermine them. For iCloud, this order will allow UK intelligence agents or law enforcement to access your encrypted data.
The UK government routinely refuses to report notifications issued under the IPA, but security experts weaken the security protections that iPhone manufacturers offer to all users, including those with whom they are located. It warned that such secret orders could have global impact if they were forced to do so. Outside of the UK.
The presence of software vulnerabilities presents a risk that could be exploited by other types of agents. It can also be to deploy hackers or other bad actors who want to access for the creepy purpose of stolen identity theft or trying to get and sell sensitive data, or ransomware.
This may explain why the main phrase used mainly on state-driven attempts to access E2EE is this visual abstraction of the backdoor. Requesting vulnerabilities that are intentionally added to your code makes the trade-offs more clear.
To use an example: With regard to physical doors, in a building, wall, etc., it is never guaranteed that only the property owner or key holder will use that entry point exclusively.
The presence of openings creates access possibilities. For example, someone could get a copy of the key, or even break the door and push his way.
Conclusion: There are no completely selective entrances and exits that exist to allow only certain people to pass. It logically continues that if someone else can enter, someone else might be able to use the door.
The same access risk principle applies to vulnerabilities added to software (or in fact hardware).
The concept of backdoors in Nobody Bry Us has been awakened by security services in the past. This particular type of backdoor is based on an assessment of its technical capabilities to exploit certain vulnerabilities that are usually superior to everything else. Essentially, it’s an ostensibly more secure backdoor that only your own agents can access exclusively.
However, in its very nature, technology skills and abilities are a moving feat. Evaluating other unknown technical capabilities is not an accurate science either. The concept of “nobus” is already in a questionable assumption. Third-party access creates the risk of opening fresh vectors for attacks, such as social engineering techniques aimed at targeting people with “authorized” access.
Naturally, many security experts have dismissed Novas as a fundamentally flawed idea. Simply put, access creates risk. Therefore, promoting backdoors is to counter strong security.
But regardless of these clear and current security concerns, the government continues to seek backdoors. So that’s why we have to talk about them.
The term “backdoor” also means that such requests can be secret rather than public, just as backdoors are not public entry points. In the case of Apple’s iCloud, requests to compromise encryption made under the UK IPA cannot be legally disclosed by the recipient via a “technical competency notification” or TCN. The intent of the law is that such background is a design secret. (It is important to note that leaking TCN details to the press is one mechanism to avoid information blocking, but Apple has not yet published these reports.)
According to rights groups, the Electronic Frontier Foundation was created to allow unknown access to the system, with the term “backdoor” dating back to the 1980s, with backdoors (and “trapdoors”) being used. You have referenced your private account and/or password. However, for many years, the term has been used to label a wide range of attempts to break down, avoid, or compromise effective data security through encryption.
The backdoor is back in the news again, but it’s important to note that data access requests go back decades, thanks to the UK chasing Apple’s encrypted iCloud backups.
For example, returning to the 1990s, the US National Security Agency (NSA) is a way of processing burned voice and data messages with the aim of allowing encrypted communications to be intercepted. We have developed encrypted hardware. “Clipper Tip” used the Key Escrow system as is known. That is, encryption keys were created and stored to facilitate access to encrypted data if desired by national authorities.
The NSA’s attempt to pack tips at baked-in-backdoors failed to have a lack of adoption after a backlash of security and privacy. The Clipper chip is believed to help dismantle cryptographers’ efforts to develop and spread strong cryptographic software to protect data against government control.
Clipper chips are also a good example of where attempts to mandate system access have been made public. It is worth noting that backdoors do not necessarily have to be a secret. (In the case of the UK iCloud, the state agents clearly wanted Apple users to gain access without knowing it.)
Additionally, the government has been working to drum public support and pressure service providers to follow data, including claiming that access to E2E is necessary to combat child abuse and terrorism. frequently deploy requests to access. or prevent other heinous crimes.
However, backdoors have a way to come back to bite the creator. For example, China-backed hackers were behind a compromise on federally mandated wiretapping systems last fall. In that case, non-E2EE data (without any data) is highlighting the risk of intentionally burning blanket access points into the system.
Governments should also worry about foreign backdoors creating risks for their citizens and national security.
There have been multiple instances that Chinese hardware and software suspected of having a background for many years. Due to concerns about potential backdoor risk, some countries, including the UK, have taken steps to remove or limit the use of Chinese technology products, such as components used in critical communications infrastructure in recent years. It’s now. Fear of backdoors can also be a powerful motivation.
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